Puzzles

-Frege's puzzle
-Kripke's puzzle(s)
-A puzzle about indefinites
-A puzzle about pronouns 
-A puzzle about descriptions
-(A puzzle about identity/coordination)


-sameness/differences/coordination;
-Fregean senses/guises/words(lexical item);
-attitude and attitude ascription/attribution;
-varieties of attitudes: belief, desire, doubt, suspect, etc.;
-presupposition and presupposition projection
-Russellian vs. Fregean(Strawsonian) re. descriptions:
(a) descriptivist vs. referentialist; (b) assertion vs. presupposition
-Russellian/Millian vs. Fregean re. names: direct reference vs. senses

荒廢許久的這裡

表示在忙著做別的事情。

過去半年，每週都跟Josh與Hans會面，討論問題，檢討文章，

大概是兩個禮拜生一個chapter，很多很多的writing, re-writing，

最後一個多月，最後兩個多禮拜，感謝David的提點，還有重大修改，

以及許多許多的整理。

最後的成品大致上是滿意的，

至少比去年夏天完成的垃圾初稿好上許多，

算是有個完整的架構。

這個過程學到很多。

當自己很仔細很仔細地看，可以看出以前沒能看到的東西，

也漸漸有自己的想法，還能把這個聯想到那個，那個串到這個，

感覺像是一點通了，其他都順多了，整個sense升級。

思考，大量地書寫，與對的人討論，廣而深的閱讀，是關鍵。

感謝我有這麼好的老師，這麼好的環境，

能作研究，其實是luxury, 更是一種privilege。

慶幸自己的好運氣。

還有很多很多的不足，還需要很多很多的努力，

這只是一個新的起點。

To do list

A.

Situations and quantifications:

i. relative clause. why situations?

ii. symmetric vs. asymmetric construals

iii. other quantifiers. e.g. 'exactly one' and 'no'

iv. dogs and leashes

Intensional Contexts:

i. modal subordination (quantificational subordination)

ii. intensional identity. Hob-Nob sentences

B.

Elbourne

C.

DRT

intensional contexts:

i. Roberts, Frank, Asher, Geurts

DRT vs. E-type

Barker's double-bind problem

DRT vs. Elbourne

assignment function, sequence, situation

construction of DRS cf. situations

Kripke's puzzle

Pierre assents to 'Londre est jolie.'
=> A. Pierre believes that London is pretty.

Pierre assents to 'London is not pretty.'
=> B. Pierre believes that London is not pretty.

Does Pierre believe that London is pretty or not?

[the question should be taken de dicto instead of de re]

The following theses cannot be true altogether:

1. Belief report A is correct.
2. Belief report B is correct.
3. Belief reports are not contradictory.
4. Pierre is rational.
5. Rational people don't end up with contradictory beliefs.

Which thesis do we give up?

*******************************************************************
- Pierre's beliefs are about, without doubt, the city London.
(It doesn't make too much sense to say that London is part of Pierre's thoughts, because after all, Pierre's thoughts or beliefs are mental, but London is a city, something physical and takes up certain space.)

P: Pierre believes, of the city London, that it is pretty;
Q: Pierre believes, of the city London, that it is not pretty.

- 'London' and 'Londre' refer to the same object, the city London, but do so with different 'mode of presentation.'


- Would the following paraphrases help?
1. Pierre believes 'the city he calls by "Londre"' is pretty.
1.1 Pierre believes 'the city he identifies via description F, G, H, ... is pretty.'

2. Pierre believes 'the city he calls by "London"' is not pretty
2.1 Pierre believes 'the city he identifies via description F', G', H', ... is not pretty.

Hence,

P': Pierre believes, of the city London, which he identifies/understand via descriptions F, G, H, ...., that it is pretty.
Q': Pierre believes, of the city London, which he identifies/understand via descriptions F', G', H', ... , that it is not pretty.


- But even when the name 'London' and 'Londre' are replaces by definite description, the puzzle remains. For the denotation of the relevant definite descriptions (assuming that definite descriptions work according to the descriptivist picture) is the city London. There is just no way that the city 'escapes' from the belief reports.

- What if descriptions F, G, H, ..... and F', G,' H', .... are the same?

- Perhaps the object of belief is not an 'object,' but the sense/mode of presentation of an object?

- For Pierre, there is no puzzle. The scenario depicted is a puzzle for us, people who know that it is the city London that Pierre's beliefs are about.

- It is not that Pierre is irrational; he is just ignorant of the fact that 'London' and 'Londre' refer to the same city. Pierre should not be held guilty for his lack of knowledge. But what is our criterion of 'being rational'? To be able to react to contradictions when they are located, or to be able to locate contradictions?

- Does Pierre use 'London' and 'Londre' correctly? What does it take for a rational agent to use a name correctly? Pierre's use of 'London' and 'Londre' does not require him to know that ref 'London' = ref 'Londre'

- something along the externalist line? To refer to an object (like water) or in this case, a city, one need not possess full knowledge of it (in the case of water, one need not know it is H2O; as long as it really is).

two readings?

Some philosopher admires every linguist.

Somehow I get the existential universal reading only; but apparently native speaker of English can get the universal existential reading as well.


*****************************************************************
Some paper of his is an embarrassment to every philosopher.

I can make sense of the universal existential reading here, understanding 'his' as bound by 'every philosopher.'
But this reading takes more time to get (for me).


*****************************************************************
Someone is robbed every 15 minutes in NYC.

This one is much better.
It is probably because of the pragmatics--- it's not very likely that there is such an unfortunate person.

three kinds of "only"

The person that no one likes(not really), the only self-admirer and the narcissist---

(i) Only Bill likes Bill.
v: for all
b: Bill
Lxy: x likes y

Vx(Lxb -> x=b )


(ii) Only Bill likes himself.

Vx(Lxx -> x=b)


(iii) Bill likes only himself.

Vx(Lbx -> x=b)

the success and failure of transitivity, again

1.
John is taller than Jack; Jack is taller than Joey.
It follows that John is taller than Joey.


2.
John likes Jack; Jack likes Joey.
But it doesn't follow that John likes Jack.


3.
John thinks that he is taller than Jack; Jack thinks that he is taller than Joey. It doesn't follow that John thinks he is taller than Joey.


4.
John thinks that he is taller than Jack, and John thinks that Jack is taller than Joey. Does John think he is taller than Joey?

a: John
b: Jack
c: Joey

******************************************

R1xy: x is taller than y

R1ab, R1bc => R1ac

******************************************

R2xy: x likes y

R2ab, R2bc =/=> R2ac

******************************************

R3xy: x thinks that x is taller than y

R3ab, R3bc =/=> R3ac

******************************************

R4xy: John thinks that x is taller than y (CAN WE DO THIS?)

R4ab, R4bc => R4ac

the success and failure of transitivity

John is taller than Jack; Jack is taller than Joey.
It follows that John is taller than Joey.


John likes Jack; Jack likes Joey.
But it doesn't follow that John likes Jack.


John thinks that he is taller than Jack; Jack thinks that he is taller than Joey. It doesn't follow that John thinks he is taller than Joey.

一個階段的結束

昨晚做了奇幻的夢

懷孕了
孩子的爹不知是誰 更不知是怎麼來的
焦慮莫名

跟一群人在road trip
好像是什麼冒險 (找holy grail之類的)
一面掩飾 一面尋找解答
在各地奔波 穿梭在各色奇異的世界 遇見各樣古怪的人

為著這夢 沒有睡好


感覺就是一個準

這就是目前的狀態

proposal是那身分不明的孩子
種種偶然跟巧合 說真的也不知它是怎麼來的
焦慮倒是確確實實
不知道能不能被接受


下午defense之後
老師們讓我先出去等會兒
他們討論的時候其實我都想
過不過也就是一個過程

一種經歷罷了




總之
在十月結束前
我悄悄走了一步

prospectus defense

coming up!

arguments for the existence of God(2)

a posteriori argument: 第一因論證（first cause argument）
a priori argument: 本體論論證（ontological argument）

先解釋名詞
a posteriori 中文翻做 後驗 a priroi翻成 先驗
怎麼樣？中文出來還是不懂吧！ （所以翻譯跟解釋還是有差的）
這裡的 驗 就是 經驗
這兩個詞其實是'知識論'(epistemology)裡兩大知識範疇 先驗知識 與 後驗知識
必須依賴經驗而得的 就是後驗知識 例如從感官經驗得來的知識 歸納得來的知識
不須經驗的 便是先驗知識 譬如 邏輯跟數學
但仔細想想 哪有知識是不須經驗的？
上數學課 邏輯課 還不是要拿筆拿紙算來算去的？
所謂'不依靠經驗' 我的想法是
a priori knowledge在來源上不依靠特定的經驗 在驗證或證成上也不須特定的經驗
像是數學定義裡的點線面或著是圓形三角形 經驗世界裡都不存在
我們證明直角三角形非直角的兩個內角和為九十度也從不會拿把量角器量出來的數據當作證明或反證
[這是很有趣的題目 但不是這次的重點 有機會再多寫一些]


用在論證的分類裡 '先驗論證'便是'不依靠經驗的論證' '後驗論證'則相反
好 回到關於上帝存在


後驗論證一：第一因論證

我們在經驗當中觀察到有果必有因 nothing happens without a cause
這個世界是如此運行地 同樣地這個世界的產生必然也有個因
那萬事萬物的起始 長長一串因果序列的起點 所謂推動一切'不動的動者(unmovable mover)'就是上帝

short comment: 無限的因果序列難道不可能嗎？有什麼道理說因果序列有個起始點？就算有起始點 那就ㄧ定是上帝？


後驗論證二：watch-maker analogy
鐘錶與世界相比
世界的複雜度遠遠勝於鐘錶
鐘錶都有設計者 這個世界必然也有設計者
這個世界的設計者就是上帝
(放在現在的context 應該說電腦一定有設計者 世界比電腦更複雜 所以世界必然有設計者)

short comment: 鐘錶的設計者不一定是一個人吧？再說設計者跟製造者也不一定視同一個(群)
鐘錶如此 這世界豈不更有可能是被ㄧ群設計者/製造者創造出來的？


先驗論證一：Descarte's version
上帝的是最完美的 祂有一切美好的屬性(property)
存在是完美的屬性之一
所以上帝存在


先驗論證二：Anselm's version
如果最完美偉大的存有者並不存在 那麼會有一個比最完美偉大存有者更完美偉大的存有者
不可能會有比最完美偉大的存有者更完美為大的存有
所以最完美偉大的存有者必然存在 (這整個是繞口令嗎？)

short comment:為什麼存在是美好的一種？世界上有許多惡的存在 貧窮 飢荒 貪婪 殺戮 難道這些也是美好的？
另外 我們可以輕易想像一個完美的島嶼(陽光沙灘清涼的海水徐徐的微風) 可是這樣一個完美的島嶼並不一定存在
(我們可以想像一個無敵帥哥 英挺俊俏和善多金肌肉線條超讚未婚又愛你！ 可是這樣的超級帥哥 百分之五百不存在！)

arguments for the existence of God(1)

pragmatic arguments

[會突然想寫關於上帝存在的論證 是因為暑假末參加了Serena教會團契舉辦的orientation camp(是的 我不是新生 但還是去玩)也去了一兩次她們團契 在各式活動的進行中 特別是聽牧師'講道'的時候 許多以前的感覺陸續跑出來 回家之後也找Serena談了一回
不過 還是寫下來比較好 特別是曾經在書本上看來的那些'論證']

先從'賭徒論證'開始 很簡單
上帝存在與否只有兩種可能 存在 或是不存在
如果你信上帝 而上帝確實存在 那麼你得永生；如果上帝不存在 你虛無的信仰其實並沒有什麼壞處
如果你不信 而上帝存在 那你就得下地獄！ 如果上帝不存在 你什麼影響也不會

也就是說
作為一個聰明的賭徒 應該選擇相信
因為如果上帝不存在 你信不信沒差
但要是上帝存在 信不信就差很多 一個是永生 一個是死亡
何必冒著死的危險呢？

burge on externalism and self-knowledge

descriptive identification and definite description

possible worlds

Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds
1.8 plentitude
1.9 actuality

this-world=acutal world
no absolute acutality; all actualities are relative



Plantinga
absolute actual world=α
this-world=whichever world where the phrase is uttered

necessity de re vs. de dicto

A man can run 100m within 10sec.
Bill is a man.
Bill cannot run 100m within 10sec.

binding

semantic binding vs. syntactic binding

Reinhart
Heim

1. indexing/co-indexing
2. conditions for syntactic binding (binding theory conditions A,B,C)
3. double indexing?
4. constraints on bound variable reading, not co-valuation(co-reference)
5. examples
6. problematic cases (violation of the sytactic-semantic binding)
7. Reinhart's 'pragmatic' guidance?
8. Schlenker--syntax->semantics->pragmatics
9. SDRT solution

Evans on Frege

Evans makes two major claims--
(A) Frege's theory is Russellian;
(B) Frege is inconsistent in attributing senses to empty singular terms.

A.

1. Meaning, according to the later Frege, has two aspects: reference and sense.
   
2. The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its parts.
   
3. The reference of a singular term is its referent; the reference of a
   sentence is its truth-value. So a truth value is a referent (and, for Frege, a sentence is a species of name).
   
4. The sense of a singular term is the mode of presentation; the sense
   of a sentence is the thought it expresses: a mode of presentation of a truth value.
   
5. A sentence expresses a thought only if the singular term it contains
   has a referent. (p.12) [Not sure who thinks this or why. Do you regard it as a consequence of (4) plus the general idea that there is no mode of presentation without an object presented? If so, the argument could proceed more swiftly.]
   
6. A sentence has a truth-value only if it expresses a thought. (p.12)
   
7. Hence, a sentence containing an empty singular term does not express
   a thought, and it has no truth-value either.
   
8. That is, a sentence containing an empty singular term has neither a
   sense nor a reference; it is meaningless.
   
9. 9. A theory of meaning is Russellian if it is a view that 'someone who
   uttered a sentence containing an empty singular term would fail to say
   anything, in the sense that he would fail to express a thought.' (p.12)
   
   
10. Hence, Frege's theory of meaning is Russellian. [from 8,9]
    
    B.
    
11. An empty singular term has a sense.
    
12. The sense of a sentence is the thought it expresses.
    
13. The sense of a sentence is a function from its parts.
    
14. Hence, a sentence containing an empty singular term has a
    sense. [from 11,12,13]
    
15. Hence, a sentence containing an empty singular term expresses a
    thought. [from 12, 14] [[15 contradicts 7]]
    
16. A determinate thought has a truth-value. (p.24?) [Not sure where this comes from. As Frege says that a sentence containing an empty name expresses a thought but has no truth value, this seems an easy way to make Frege out to be inconsistent!]
    
17. A sentence containing an empty singular term has a
    truth-value. [from 15, 16]
    
18. A sentence containing an empty singular term has no truth-value.
    [from 7]
    
    
19. Hence, Frege is inconsistent in attributing senses to empty
    singular terms. [[17 contradicts 18]]

Russellain: the view that someone who uttered a sentence containing an
empty singular term would fail to say anything, in the sense that he
would fail to express a thought. p.12

Russellain singular term: a singular term whose significance depends
upon its having a referent. p.12
Q:A singular term without a referent can still be significant-- it has
a sense.
A: An empty name with a sense is just inconsistent!

Evans on Russell

Russellian referring expressions
=logical proper names
=demonstratives
= sentence containing such a term would be meaningless if the term has no referent.

Evans wants to say--
Referring expressions ~=Russellian referring expressions
Referring expressions have two sub-categories:
(1) Russellian singular terms &
(2) descriptive names

Q: how is a descriptive name different from a definite description?

Evans presents an argument that, by adopting a pecular definition of 'reference (as closely related to truth),' descriptive names(DN) and definite descriptions(DD) are referring expressions.
So this argument, if successful, shows that DN are referring expressions.
But it also shows that DD are referring expression, which is just not the case.
Hence Evans need to find a way to dissimilate DD and DN, and says that the DD is not referring expressions.

Evans considers three arugments from Russell to the conclusion that DDs are not referring expressions.
(A) one can fail to know that two DDs have the same referent. <--> assumes that REs are such as to render knowledge of coreference obligatory.
(B) the scope of negation <-->assumes that all REs are Russellian.
(C) if DDs are REs, they would be meaningless if empty.<--> question-begging

[2.4]

more on descriptive names!

rigid, but can be empty...

varieties of reference

gareth evans

1. Frege
2. Russell
3. Recent Works


theory of Meaning
theory of sense

referring expressions
singular terms
Russellian referring expressions
definite descriptions
descriptive names
proper names

definite descriptions are not referring expressions
descriptive names are not descriptions in disguise