Kripke's puzzle

Pierre assents to 'Londre est jolie.'
=> A. Pierre believes that London is pretty.

Pierre assents to 'London is not pretty.'
=> B. Pierre believes that London is not pretty.

Does Pierre believe that London is pretty or not?

[the question should be taken de dicto instead of de re]

The following theses cannot be true altogether:

1. Belief report A is correct.
2. Belief report B is correct.
3. Belief reports are not contradictory.
4. Pierre is rational.
5. Rational people don't end up with contradictory beliefs.

Which thesis do we give up?

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- Pierre's beliefs are about, without doubt, the city London.
(It doesn't make too much sense to say that London is part of Pierre's thoughts, because after all, Pierre's thoughts or beliefs are mental, but London is a city, something physical and takes up certain space.)

P: Pierre believes, of the city London, that it is pretty;
Q: Pierre believes, of the city London, that it is not pretty.

- 'London' and 'Londre' refer to the same object, the city London, but do so with different 'mode of presentation.'


- Would the following paraphrases help?
1. Pierre believes 'the city he calls by "Londre"' is pretty.
1.1 Pierre believes 'the city he identifies via description F, G, H, ... is pretty.'

2. Pierre believes 'the city he calls by "London"' is not pretty
2.1 Pierre believes 'the city he identifies via description F', G', H', ... is not pretty.

Hence,

P': Pierre believes, of the city London, which he identifies/understand via descriptions F, G, H, ...., that it is pretty.
Q': Pierre believes, of the city London, which he identifies/understand via descriptions F', G', H', ... , that it is not pretty.


- But even when the name 'London' and 'Londre' are replaces by definite description, the puzzle remains. For the denotation of the relevant definite descriptions (assuming that definite descriptions work according to the descriptivist picture) is the city London. There is just no way that the city 'escapes' from the belief reports.

- What if descriptions F, G, H, ..... and F', G,' H', .... are the same?

- Perhaps the object of belief is not an 'object,' but the sense/mode of presentation of an object?

- For Pierre, there is no puzzle. The scenario depicted is a puzzle for us, people who know that it is the city London that Pierre's beliefs are about.

- It is not that Pierre is irrational; he is just ignorant of the fact that 'London' and 'Londre' refer to the same city. Pierre should not be held guilty for his lack of knowledge. But what is our criterion of 'being rational'? To be able to react to contradictions when they are located, or to be able to locate contradictions?

- Does Pierre use 'London' and 'Londre' correctly? What does it take for a rational agent to use a name correctly? Pierre's use of 'London' and 'Londre' does not require him to know that ref 'London' = ref 'Londre'

- something along the externalist line? To refer to an object (like water) or in this case, a city, one need not possess full knowledge of it (in the case of water, one need not know it is H2O; as long as it really is).